Notes on Slavery, Philemon and Onesimus

One of the many reasons why the Epistle to Philemonmeans so much to modern Americans, why it is so completely emotional, isbecause it echoes that traumatic division which occurred in the civil war (1861– 1865) of which the central and fractious issue was of slavery. Religiousauthorities on both sides fought their own theological battles, and theirprincipal weapon was the Bible. Neither hesitated to cite relevant articles ofscripture to support their views. One of the worst interpretations of Philemonamongst Southern clergymen was that Onesimus, although a slave had throughmysterious divine will been converted to Christian faith and found salvation.This, they claimed, completely justified the state of slavery. African heathensbrought to the New World in chains, to a state of slavery in America, were nowChristian slaves – and could revel in a hope of eternal salvation. In May 1861the Presbyterian Church met for their General Assembly in Philadelphia. Theissue of slavery split them in two, the Southern Church departed and inDecember 1861 adopted a statement written by James Henry Thornwell, a championof servitude;

“… We may be denounced, despised, and cast out ofthe synagogues of our brethren. But while they are wrangling about thedistinctions of men according to the flesh, we shall go forward in our divinework and confidently anticipate that, in the great day, as the consequence ofour humble labors, we shall meet millions of glorified spirits who have come upfrom the bondage of earth to a nobler freedom than human philosophy everdreamed of. Others, if they please, may spend their time in declaiming on thetyranny of earthly masters; it will be our aim to resist the real tyrants whichoppress the soul sin and Satan. These are the foes against whom we shall findit employment enough to wage a successful war. And to this holy war is thepurpose of our church to devote itself with redoubled energy. We feel that thesouls of our slaves are a solemn trust, and we shall strive to present themfaultless and complete before the presence of God….” – James Henry Thornwell, Minutesof the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States ofAmerica, Vol. I, Augusta, Ga., 1861, Appendix, pp. 55-59.

Going back in time, 150 years and browsing through thediaries of Cotton Mather (1663 – 1728), a Harvard graduate (1681) a New EnglandPuritan minister… we are struck by his devotion to Christianity, not a daypassed in his life without some deep and meaningful thought concerning thedivine. Mather constantly expresses his abysmal state of sin. He is chieflyremembered for two things; laying the foundation for the Salem Witch Trials,and ‘inventing’ a new method of administering a remedy for small pox – that ofinoculation. December 1706 contains an interesting entry:

“It was my Resolution, that I would study somesingular Way, in which, my Sins, (my pardoned and covered Sins! rich Grace,towards the Chief of Sinners!) may afford some great Revenues of Glory to theLord… In the Afternoon of this Day, I visited a Society of devout Women, whowere keeping this, as a Day of private and solemn Thanksgiving unto God. Iprayed with them; and I preached to them… This Day, a surprising Thing befelme. Some Gentlemen of our Church, understanding (without any Application ofmine to them for such a Thing,) that I wanted a good Servant at the expence ofbetween forty and fifty Pounds, purchased for me, a very likely Slave; a youngMan, who is a Negro of a promising Aspect and Temper, and this Day theypresented him unto me. It seems to be a mighty Smile of Heaven upon my Family;and it arrives at an observable Time unto me. I putt upon him the Name ofOnesimus; and I resolved with the Help of the Lord, that I would use the bestEndeavours to make him a Servant of Christ, and also be more serviceable thanever to a Flock, which laies me under such Obligations…” – Diary of CottonMather, Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston (1911)

Outside of Cotton Mather’s journals, little is knowof Onesimus – that he lived circa 1706 (the date of his purchase as a slave) to1717 when he managed to purchase his freedom. Mather records in his diary thatOnesimus became troublesome, and after purchasing another slave with moneyprovided by Onesimus, he wrote him a letter of manumission. In 1721 we learnthat Cotton Mather had got the idea of a smallpox inoculation from Onesimus’ssuggestion. Nothing is know about Onesimus after this time, but he was one ofabout 1000 people living in and around Boston and in Massachusetts. Like theOnesimus in the Letter to Philemon, the Boston Onesimus simply disappears inhistory without a marker or a gravestone to record his life. Yet what remainsis a still troubled legacy of slavery – and every time the letters of Paul areread, we are reminded of that inheritance.

Image: 1845 Daguerreotype of abolitionist, Jonathon Walker's (1799 – 1878) branded hand by Southworth & Hawes. Marked with ‘SS’ for ‘slave-stealer.’ Jonathon Walker was an American reformer who became a national hero in 1844 when he was tried and sentenced as a slave stealer following his attempt to help seven runaway slaves find freedom. He was branded on his hand by the United States Government with the markings S.S. for "Slave Stealer". - Jonathan Walker, The Branded Hand: The Trial and Imprisonment of Jonathan Walker, at Pensacola, Florida, for Aiding Slaves to Escape from Bondage (Boston: Anti-Slavery Society, 1848)

Edinburgh University: Philosophy and the Sciences

1. In what way can philosophy or philosophical thinking contribute to the physical sciences?

What is science? What is the difference between science and pseudo-science? What is the relationship between philosophy and science?  This essay assesses the important liaison between science and philosophy, how science emerged historically out of philosophy, and argues for the maintenance and continued interdependence relationship of the two. What is science, whence does it come and to what purpose? The etymology of the term science is derived from the Latin noun scientia (knowledge, learning) combined with the verb scire (to know). The term was universally applied within the context of, and in connection with natural philosophy.

 

Science as we understand it today, as the systematic empirical analysis of the structure and dynamics of the natural world through observation could be said to have originated in the Western world with the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, accredited as being the founder of the school of natural sciences according to Aristotle in his ‘Metaphysics.’ (Metaph. 983 b21-22). The first to investigate nature, the world, astronomy, and cosmology. Science as a discipline, evolved out of ‘philosophia naturalis’ (natural philosophy). However, since the Enlightenment, science and philosophy have formed their own distinct disciples.

 

The divergence in the roles of science and philosophy is the cause of much dispute. Alexander Spirkin, in ‘Philosophy and Science’ (Dialectical Materialism, 1983) asks whether philosophy and science can work in concord, and construct a symbiotic partnership? 

 

“Can philosophy develop by itself, without the support of science? Can science "work" without philosophy? Some people think that the sciences can stand apart from philosophy, that the scientist should actually avoid philosophising, the latter often being understood as groundless vague theorising… The sciences cannot and should not break their connections with philosophy…”

 

A principle scientific, heuristic tool appears to have emerged through the Fransiscan scholar William of Occam in the first half of the 14^th century – which has come to be called ‘Occam’s Razor.’ Occam’s principle (as it was later stated) postulated that amongst competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. However, this principle is not to be found in any of his works. The closest methodology that Occam expresses in terms of scientific enquiry is that of logic, in his Summa Logicae (c. 1323):

 

“Logic is the most useful tool of all the arts. Without it no science can be fully known. It is not worn out by repeated use, after the manner of material tools, but rather admits of continual growth through the diligent exercise of any other science. For just as a mechanic who lacks a complete knowledge of his tool gains a fuller [knowledge] by using it, so one who is educated in the firm principles of logic, while he painstakingly devotes his labor to the other sciences, acquires at the same time a greater skill at this art…”

 

An example of the continued relationship between science and philosophy is Isaac newton’s 1687 treatise ‘The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.’ It is important to note that Newton did not regard himself as acting in any specialized field outside of philosophy, rather to avoid any possible misunderstanding amongst his readers he maintained (four) Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy (appearing completely in the final edition of 1726). These Four Rules revolutionized the investigation of all the world’s unsolved mysteries and natural phenomena, providing him with a new analytical formula to replace that which Aristotle had established, and to update the Galileo’s experimental method. 

 

1) Admit no more causes of natural things than are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. 2) To the same natural effect, assign the same causes. 3) Qualities of bodies, which are found to belong to all bodies within experiments, are to be esteemed universal. 4) Propositions collected from observation of phenomena should be viewed as accurate or very nearly true until contradicted by other phenomena.

 

A contemporary of Isaac Newton (indeed they actually met in June, 1689), Christian Hugyens (1629 – 1695) proceeded to provide a definitive demarcation between the fields of science (philosophy) and mathematics. What separated the two was the notion of ‘proof.’ Hugyens established the hypothetico-deductive method, he remarks in his ‘Treatise on Light’ (1690):

 

“One finds in this subject a kind of demonstration which does not carry with it so high a degree of certainty as that employed in geometry; and which differs distinctly from the method employed by geometers in that they prove their propositions by well-established and incontrovertible principles, while here principles are tested by inferences which are derivable from them. The nature of the subject permits of no other treatment. It is possible, however, in this way to establish a probability which is little short of certainty. This is the case when the consequences of the assumed principles are in perfect accord with the observed phenomena, and especially when these verifications are numerous; but above all when one employs the hypothesis to predict new phenomena and finds his expectations realized…”

 

This was the point from which science became a separate discipline from philosophy. The one practicing science proposes a hypothesis and only then attempts to prove it’s correctness through experimentation and empirical analysis. Contrary to this, nothing could be proven beyond doubt in philosophy. As science developed in it’s own right, the gulf between it and philosophy widened. Despite this, the philosopher was still seemingly accepted as the progenitor of scientific questions and charged with the sort of research that provided answers.

 

Perhaps the breaking ground for separation between science and philosophy was the development of experimental science of ‘empirical evidence.’ Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) proposed a radical, new style of scientific reasoning in contrast to that form of Aristotelian argumentation in his works the ‘Advancement of Learning’ (1605) and the  ‘Novum Organum’ (1620). Bacon advocated an inductive method of reasoning and laid the foundations for the ‘scientific method’ proper. No scientific hypothesis can be accepted without the provision of empirical evidence, facts which, coupled with inference by which a conclusion can be maintained on the basis of observations and experiments. Further, evidence is proof that depends on inference such that it enables the scientist to examine his or her hypothesis in such a way as to see if facts are relevant in support of, or run counter to the hypothesis.

 

Dorian Sagan in ‘The Cosmic Apprentice’ (2013) argues that whilst science needs rigorous methodologies – in the process of becoming it’s own micro-discipline it has transformed into dogmatism. It hides behind an impenetrable mask of theoretical language, which is comprehensible only to intellectuals. Science must re-connect rather than insist on submerging itself further into the realms of academia. 

 

William Whewell (1794 – 1866), a philosopher, theologian and historian of science was, according to the OED the first to employ the term ‘scientist’ in 1833. In a semantic argument with the romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who claimed that philosopher was too lofty a term with which to describe the practical employment of those in the natural sciences, Whewell suggested the combination of ‘savans’ (a skilled, intelligent person), by analogy, with ‘artist’ to form ‘scientist.’ Whewell later used the term ‘scientist’ in a satirical sense in a review of a book written by Mary Somerville and entitled ‘On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences.’ It was Whewell’s intention to point out an ever-increasing separation between the activities of the independent scientist and those of the philosopher – with the introduction of highly specified terms such as physicist, mathematician, chemist, and naturalist.

 

The main thrust and progressive path of modern science has coalesced into what many opponents have termed ‘scientism,’ the overreliance of the scientific community on the universal applicability of the scientific method, and the belief that diagnostic empirical science alone constitutes the sole authoritative and rational explanation for natural phenomena. The philosopher Tom Sorell in his work ‘Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science’ (1994) proposes that over-identification with rational scientific methodologies has done much harm to western philosophy, the arts and humanities. Sorell points out that philosophy is certainly not science, and he dismisses the notion of attempting to revive ‘natural philosophy.’ Scientism first appeared as logical positivism. Defined by a group called the ‘Vienna Circle’ in 1922. The ultimate goal of the Vienna Circle was to establish a ‘unified science’ within which every statement was solely a product of absolute, verifiable experience and expressed by pure logic. 

 

It may not be possible to reduce all observations to a logical formula, however the claim is that scientific reasoning is based on the inductive method. The philosopher Karl Popper (1902 – 1994) criticized and rejected induction in favor of the ‘falsification theory’ by claiming that the scientific method was in fact deductive, and lacked logic. Falsification does not attempt to secure or prove a conclusion by fact, but introduces a statement posed as a question, that must be proven false by competing evidence. 

 

Another type of reasoning employed in science is ‘inference to the best explanation’ – often also called ‘abduction.’ This type of argument doesn’t attempt to directly prove the validity of an argument, but merely maintains that the conclusion of a theory is the best or superior of all the possible explanations, and therefore inferentially true. In his book ‘The Scientific Image,’ (1980) Bas van Fraasen proposes an alternative (constructive empiricism) to scientific realists who employ IBE in defense of their theories, especially those that discuss unobservable phenomena. 

 

Conclusion

 

Both science and philosophy are interactive in asking the most basic questions regarding the nature of the world around us. They share methodological reasoning as the basis for their research. The methods vary, but the resulting debates are invigorating and creative. A pro-active working relationship between philosophy and science prohibits a drift toward sterility. 

 

Perhaps the most fruitful contribution to the debate of the relationship between philosophy and science is Thomas Kuhn’s ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962). Kuhn introduced a new paradigm with the suggestion that science doesn’t possess any a particular method of argumentation. Kuhn challenged the accepted view of science as possessing an accumulative agenda with regard to knowledge and theories. Science does not proceed in a straight historical line, with each new discovery building on the last. Rather the process is broken into revolutions, crisis and ‘normal’ periods. 

 

There were two major reactions amongst the scientific community to Kuhn’s book: firstly, those who believed that he had introduced a particularly human element into scientific history, and those who suggested that he was attempting to insert an irrational and chaotic element into what were previously thought of as brilliant scientific achievements. Rather, Kuhn has suggested a new paradigmatic model that embraces the need to re-evaluate ourselves; the objects of our study and discover creative and innovative ways for solving problems. This cannot be done in isolation, but rather in a dynamic community. It is on this level that philosophy can enrich science, and vice-versa.

All Rights Reserved & Copyright // David John Drew 2015

2. In what way can cognitive science inform issues in the philosophy of mind? 

 

Introduction: Mind and Consciousness; The Human Frontier

 

We stand on the frontiers of knowledge concerning the human mind. Together with the cognitive sciences (psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence), philosophy is able to draw more informed conclusions with regard to how the brain and the mind work. Herein I will focus on consciousness, with respect to the mind-body, a topic, which is the basis of much debate between scientists and philosophers, and as of yet remains inconclusive. It is one of the most puzzling problems in science today (Sprevak, Lec. 6:1, 2014). I will focus on the various philosophical and scientific approaches to the topic of consciousness, how they relate and whether, collectively they have added to our understanding of the mind.

 

Defining the Terms

 

What do we mean by consciousness? In everyday language it is sentience; subjective perception. We might also consider it ‘wakefulness’ as opposed to sleep, or unconsciousness. A third definition proposed by the philosopher Ned Block (1942 -) constitutes two states: (P) phenomenal and (A) access consciousness, P-consciousness is the immediate subjective perception of the senses whereas A-consciousness processes information, and involves higher level forms of brain function (Block, 1998). Lastly, we might include phenomenal consciousness termed ‘qualia’ by Frank Jackson (1943 -). In opposition to physicalism, Jackson proposed the existence of ‘bodily sensations’ and ‘perceptual experiences’ (Jackson, 1982). Qualia is an almost intangible subjective sense of a particular quality, that presents us with a particular form of consciousness.

 

Intellectual-Material Distinction

 

Traditionally the approach to the subject of consciousness can be divided up into two views; those that conceive of a division between the mind and body (dualism), and the scientific view that existence, with respect to mind-body including consciousness, possesses a single material origin (monism). The latter claim that everything is essentially physical in nature, of one substance and can be described in such terms (Jaworski, 2011).

 

Dualism

 

Theories of mind-body relationship have long been in currency. Beginning with Rene Descartes 1596-1650) in his ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’ (1641), who defined it with respect to thinking, the process of ideas and perception. Descartes does not give a full, acceptable analysis of the concept of consciousness, but does provide us with the first ‘primitive’ psychological understandings of thought in terms of consciousness (Jorgensen, 2014). Perhaps Descartes major contribution to the field was his theory of ‘dualism’ positing that the mind was distinct from the physical nature of the body. In this, attempting to reconcile increasingly scientific views with that of traditional religious beliefs; the mind and body have radically different properties. 

 

Physicalism

 

Otto von Neurath (1882-1945) attempted to establish a completely universal standard system of logical empiricism which he outlined in his essay ‘Physicalism’ – such that could be applied to all of the sciences. Such a system rejects all notions of metaphysics, even associated and related forms of language and description. In line with the physicalist thesis, terminological words such as ‘consciousness’ must be replaced by neuro-physiological descriptions (Symons, Pombo, Torres, 2010) – in any sense, consciousness is reduced to physiological matters.

 

The Hard Problem: Inconclusive Conclusion

 

David Chalmers (1966 -) describes consciousness as a mundane fact of the world yet ‘mysterious’ – intangible, and almost indefinable. However he goes on to characterize it as ‘the subjective quality of experience’ (Chalmers, 1997). Experience is the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). Consciousness is difficult to grasp because it is a grey area between phenomenology and neuroscience. Whereas the cognitive sciences can readily explain processes occurring within the brain and mind, subjective experience is infinitely more difficult to grasp because it is more a perception of sensation combined with the notion that it is ‘something it is like’ to be a conscious being. Consciousness is what makes the mind-body dilemma troublesome (Nagel, 1974). Presently we are in a stalemate with regard to these two apparently irreconcilable opposing views (Sprevak, 2014). There is no unified theory of consciousness that is unconditionally accepted by both phenomenologists and physicalists (Carmel, Lec 6:2, 2014).

 

Nowhere is this division more amplified than in the most recent stand taken by philosophers such as Colin McGinn (1950 -), a position termed ‘New Mysterianism.’ In a provocative challenge, McGinn resolutely refuses the possibility of any acceptable solution to the consciousness dilemma, asking;

 

“How can Technicolor phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? … Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a total blank on the nature of this conversion…” (McGinn, 1989). 

 

References.

 

Sprevak, M. “What is Consciousness?” (Part I) Lecture 6:1 In ‘Philosophy and the Sciences’ Edinburgh University, 2014

 

Ned Block (1998). "On a confusion about a function of consciousness". In N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Guzeldere. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.

 

Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136.

 

Jaworski, W. ‘The Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction.’ John Wiley and Sons, 2011.

 

Descartes, R. ‘Meditations on First Philosophy,’ translated by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

 

“Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science” in ‘Volume 18 of Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science.’ Editors, J. Symons, O. Pomba, J. M. Torres. Springer Science, 2010.

 

Jorgensen, L. M. “Seventeenth Century Theories of Consciousness” in ‘Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’ 2014. Accessed: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-17th/

 

Chalmers, D. J. ‘The Conscious Mind: In Search of a fundamental Theory.’ Oxford University Press, 1997

 

Chalmers, D. J. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” in the ‘Journal of Consciousness Studies’ 2(3):200-19, 1995.

 

Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. 1974.

 

Carmel, D. “What is Consciousness?” (Part II) Lecture 6:2 In ‘Philosophy and the Sciences’ Edinburgh University, 2014

 

McGinn, C. "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?", in Mind, New Series, 98 (391), 1989.

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Søren Kierkegaard – Subjectivity, Irony and the Crisis of Modernity

Søren Kierkegaard – Subjectivity, Irony and the Crisis of Modernity.

 

Discussion question for Lecture 1: Usually when we are stumped or cannot find the answer to something, this is considered a bad thing. How can the negative situation or the state of aporia be regarded as something positive?

 

What is aporia? 

 

Aporia, as described by The Collins English Dictionary means; (in rhetoric) a doubt, real or professed, about what to do or say, and (in philosophy) puzzlement occasioned by the raising of philosophical objections without any proffered solutions, esp. in the works of Socrates. Word origin: from Greek, literally: a state of being at a loss.

 

Professor Stewart defines ‘aporia’ as: ‘a Greek word, which means simply, being at a loss, or, being unable to answer… and in Plato’s dialog ‘Euthyphro’ concerning a definition of piety ‘the dialog itself ends in aporia, since no definition of piety is ever agreed to.’ (Lecture 1:2)

 

“Meno: Socrates, I certainly used to hear, even before meeting you, that you never did anything else than exist in a state of perplexity (aporia) yourself and put others in a state of perplexity. And now you seem to be bewitching me and drugging me and simply subduing me with incantations, so that I come to be full of perplexity… “ (Plato’s Meno 79e-80b. Berns and Anastaplo, Focus Philosophical Library, 2004)

 

Aporia is that state of being in which one realizes that nothing can be reduced to a simple formula or description. One might even say that ‘aporia’ itself is beyond definition. The complexities of life continue to baffle many, although numerous people claim insight, wisdom and answers to difficult questions – on closer and more critical analysis even they themselves crumble and eventually espouse defeat at the greater depths. 

Peer Review Question. Maximum 2000 words.

What did Kierkegaard learn from his study of Socrates? Why is this connection between Socrates and Kierkegaard still relevant in the world today?

 

Kierkegaard

 

Introduction.

 

Many view Kierkegaard as an aberration, a disjointed link in the history and development of philosophy. As well as being awarded the title ‘Father of Existentialism’ (McDonald, 2012) he is not only regarded as a primitive psychologist but actually insane – using himself as a subject for experiments in which he is finally transformed in to a ‘groteque monster’ (Blucher, 1952). However, in order to understand the apparent contradictions, conflicts and ultimately paradoxical nature of Kierkegaard, his personality, life and work, he must be viewed in the context of his age. Kierkegaard was one that was immersed in specific time and space, not an abstract thinker, and though he preferred a self-imposed isolation in the latter half of his short life – to the end he was an active participant in the debates and issues that revolved around his native city of Copenhagen and the greater philosophical questions that occupied many European thinkers of that time. Obviously Kierkegaard was a major influence on subsequent schools of thought, particularly existentialists such as Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) and Albert Camus (1913-1960), as well as a host of artists and writers, but is Kierkegaard still relevant today? Kierkegaard still attracts a wide and diverse range of views and opinions, Dr. Edmund Phelps, professor of Political Economy at Columbia University claims that he was the ‘first philosopher of the modern economy,’ whilst others, accepting his critique of the ‘present age’ point out a defect in any recognizable political agenda, offering only a religious ‘balm’ to the general malaise (Conway, 2002). Indeed, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) proclaims him, not only the most profound thinker of the 19^th century, but also a ‘saint’ (Fremstedal, 2006). But somehow we are still baffled when reading his works, and our question is; Is Kierkegaard still relevant to us as individuals and a society today, and in what practical way?

 

Context

 

Kierkegaard was the product of a peculiar age of transforming and often conflicting social dynamics, though he exhibited an individualistic perspective and aspired to prophetic vision (Davidson, 1966). In the midst of turmoil, social, political and intellectual unrest, I propose that he took a radical step backward, and reinvented archaic wisdom to reassess the ‘present dilemma’ and create a message that remains meaningful to us today. The term ‘modern’ with specific observation and reference to the radical changing and fluctuating transitions in society may arguably be first ascribed to the French poet Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867), who in 1846, in ‘On the Heroism of Modern Life.’ Baudelaire speaks of a ‘new heroism’ emerging from the death of an ancient tradition. 

 

Whilst Baudelaire clearly evokes romanticism as an ideal, he is also pointing toward a more radical vision, albeit aesthetic; that the ancient concept of beauty be transformed into a new, modern and contemporary form that is both heroic and bold. We see a similar effort on the part of Kierkegaard as a ‘modern hero’ that accepts the ‘challenge’ – the struggle to apply classical philosophy to the ‘present age’ – amidst social, political, intellectual and cultural conflict, and prepare the ground for a new vision. The ‘aesthetic’ agenda of Romanticism whilst in opposition to the rationalism of the continuous unfolding of Enlightenment, since Rene Descartes (1596-1650), shares a curious bravado and courage that is epitomized by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in his 1784 slogan ‘Sapere Aude!’ (dare to know!) Within the context of a rapidly developing scientific era of reason, the power of man over nature, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution, on the verge of the social up-rest of the French Revolution and dissolution of absolute monarchism, and on the chaotic cusp of the Napoleonic Wars that would divide Europe – Kant proffers a challenge that is has a wholly religious target, that rejects the prominent ecclesiastical authority, and invites independent reasoning.

 

In the midst of social upheaval, turmoil and difference there were attempts to coordinate and direct the diversity of arising perspectives. In ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ (1781), Kant attempted to synthesize pure rationalism and empiricism.  Thereafter Georg Hegel (1770-1831) proposed a system of Absolute Idealism or absolute knowledge, that would somehow account for everything in his ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ (1807) to avoid contradictions, oppositions and provide a link between the immanent and the transcendent. However, Hegel is more renowned for his dialectic process of reasoning in triad form; ‘Thesis, antithesis and synthesis.’

 

Keirkegaard, like many of his contemporaries was the product of a classical education, living in a transitional age and ultimately faced with the social crises of the time. His early training at ‘The School of Civic Virtue’ from 1821 to 1830 immersed him in the study of the ancient literary world of Latin, Greek and Hebrew, to the detriment of his native Danish language (Garff, 2005). the works of Homer, Herodotus, Plato, the Bible (specifically Genesis, Exodus and the Gospel of John). It was perhaps here, in his extended readings of the Euthyphro, Apology and the Crito, and especially the ‘Memorabilia’ of Xenophon, that the young Kierkegaard first became acquainted with the figure of Socrates (Stewart, 2014). In combination with a home life dominated by the Lutheran theology of his father, perhaps to an extreme, and in combination with his increasing interest in and devotion to Socrates and the Greek philosophical tradition, the question arises as to why a modern Christian writer would turn to an ancient, Greek Pagan philosopher (like Socrates) to understand contemporary problems and issues? We find the reply much later, with Kierkegaard saying in ‘My Point of View’ (1848):

 

“… I calmly stick to Socrates… he was a dialectician and understood everything in reflection… formally I can very well call Socrates my teacher – whereas I have believed and believe in only one, the Lord Jesus Christ…”

 

Paradoxically, and ironically it was only at the end of his life, in 1855 that Kierkegaard came to definitively enunciate his mission, to prevent any confusion. Of Kierkegaard’s opponents, the principal was the Lutheran State Church of Denmark. Perhaps it was, in this his struggle between the ‘official’ church and the concept of ‘original and authentic Christianity’ that Kierkegaard envisaged himself as some sort of martyr (Garff, 2005); in this ‘Attack Upon Christendom’ he states:

 

“The only analogy I have before me is Socrates. My task is a Socratic task, to revise the definition of what it is to be a Christian…”

 

My/The Task

 

What was the task? Kierkegaard defines his task as one of coming to understand himself, his identity – not merely objective knowledge, but a deeper meaning of truth. Kierkegaard evokes the Socratic dictum ‘Know Thyself’ as a means of realizing the self. 

 

“What I really need is to get clear about what I must do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to find a purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die… something which is bound up with the deepest roots+ of my existence [Existents], through which I am, so to speak, grafted into the divine, to which I cling fast even though the whole world may collapse. This is what I need, and this is what I strive for… On must first learn to know himself before knowing anything else (γνωθι ρεαυτòν)…” - Journal entry, Gilleleie (1 August 1835) Journals 1A

 

In 1830 Kierkegaard was admitted to the University of Copenhagen. His principal teachers were; F.C. Sibbern, Poul Martin Moller, and H. L. Martensen. Of especial importance in his study were the philosophical (dialogues) writings of Plato, and through exposure to these, the developing a particular passion for Socrates that formed the basis for his Master’s Degree thesis ‘The Concept of Irony.’ 

 

Kierkegaard’s thesis exhibits not only a perceptive appreciation for Socrates and his implementation of irony is his investigative method, but also considers the relationships with the philosophical issues of his time. The thesis consists of two parts: Part One discusses the position of Socrates viewed as irony, as expressed through the works of Xenophon (The memorabilia), Plato (in the Symposium, Protagoras, Phaedo, Apology and The Republic) and Aristophanes (The Clouds), and ultimately contrasting his understanding of Socrates with that of the German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). 

 

In Part Two ‘The Concept of Irony’ Kierkegaard applies the modern manifestation of irony to the contemporary German Romantic movement, addressing particularly Hegel (again) Johan Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), and Johan Ferdinand Solger (1780-1819). 

Kierkegaard intentionally gave the work an idiosyncratic, ‘witty’ tone (Journals, III B 3). He identifies two types of irony; rapid and integral, the other demanding and arrogant. Kierkegaard does not define irony itself, but in connection with and relationship to dialectic; irony that stimulates thought then , that activates to a goal, 

 

1) An irony that is only a stimulus for thought - a dialectic that in perpetual movement continually sees to it that the question does not become entrapped in an incidental understanding - mythical

 

2) An irony that is itself the activator and in turn is itself the terminus striven for - a dialectic that, proceeding from the most abstract ideas, wants to let these display themselves in more concrete qualifications – metaphorical

 

irony [is] the infinite absolute negativity… Irony is a qualification of subjectivity… Irony is, namely, the first and most abstract qualification of subjectivity….

 

what doubt is to science, irony is to personal life… no genuinely human life is possible without irony…

 

“Irony is an existential determination, and nothing is more ridiculous than to suppose that it consists in the use of certain phraseology, or when an author congratulates himself upon succeeding in expressing himself ironically. Whoever has essential irony has it all day long, not bound to any specific form, because it is the infinite within him…” Kierkegaard –CUP – p, 276

 

“If our generation has any task at all, it must be to translate the achievement of scientific scholarship into personal life, to appropriate it personally…”

 

Hans Frederik Helveg 1856 Hegelianism in Denmark, on ‘The Concept of Irony’

 

"The members of the Faculty of Philosophy who were supposed to judge the work hardly suspected that in this effort of a young author they had not so much a qualification for a master's degree but a program for life. But here it was not a matter of giving a solution to an academic problem but of a task of life."

 

Conclusion

 

Paradoxically, despite the fact that Kierkegaard spent his life denouncing what he perceived as a complacent, state-supported church, he came to recognized as a teacher in the Lutheran calendar of saints, celebrated on 11^th November.

 

Amongst Kierkegaard’s private library were several volumes on anthropology and psychology (Stewart, 2007) including works by Karl Rozenkranz (Psychology: Or, the science of subjective spirit, 1837), Carl Gustav Carus (Psyche; on the evolution of the soul, 1846) Johann Eduard Erdmann (Love and Soul, A Contribution to the Justification of Philosophical Anthropology, 1837), Heinrich  Steffens (Anthropology, 1824) and Theodor Waitz (Textbook of Psychology as a Natural Science, 1849)

 

Kierkegaard’s theory of humor: In his theory of humor, the Danish philosopher presents a version of the incongruity theory in which humor is analyzed in terms of the ‘comical’ and suggests that the primary element in the comical is ‘contradiction.’ Kierkegaard examines humor, and it’s close relative ‘irony’, for their relations to the three ‘spheres of existence’ or the three ‘existential spheres of life’ – the aesthetic, the ethical. and the religious realms. Kierkegaard claims that ‘irony’ marks the boundary between the ethical and the aesthetic spheres, whereas ‘humor’ marks the boundary between the ethical and religious spheres. He asserts that ‘humor’  is the last stage of existential awareness before faith. Kierkegaard indicates, also, that a strong connection exists between having a religious view of life and possessing a sense of humor. He suggests that the humorous is present throughout Christianity and that Christianity is the most humorous view of life in the history of the world.

 

Reference:

 

Kierkegaard, S. (1846/1941). Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 

Roeckelein, J. E. ‘Elsevier’s Dictionary of Psychological Theories.’ Elsevier, 2006. p. 335.

 

Metaphor of the revolving door

 

The Cure (1917)

 

Charlie Chaplin plays a drunkard who checks into a health spa to dry out, but brings along a big suitcase full of alcohol. Along the way he aggravates a large man suffering from gout, evades him and encounters a beautiful young woman who encourages him to stop drinking. However, when the hotel owner learns his employees are getting drunk off Charlie's liquor, he calls an employee and orders him to have the liquor thrown out the window. The drunk employee hurls the bottles through the window, straight into the spa's health waters. The well becomes spurious with alcohol, sending the spa's inhabitants into a dancing stupor. Chaplin, encouraged by his new love to get sober, drinks from the spurious spa, gets drunk and offends her. She leaves him in anger and walks away. Charlie walks back to the door unsteadily, when he bumps into the large man, tripping him off his wheel chair and landing him into the alcoholic well. The next morning there are plenty of hangovers, but Chaplin turns sober, walks out and finds the lady. Realizing what had happened, she forgives him. They walk ahead, just then he accidentally steps into the liquor-laden well. One introduction which has since been added to the film explains that in 1917 drunkenness was a serious problem in the working class, so to keep it funny Chaplin changed from his "Little Tramp" character to an upper-class fop. Gout was at the time believed to be a disease of the wealthy, which is why Eric Campbell's character has it.

 

Bibliography

 

Blucher, Heinrich ‘XIV. A Fragment on Kierkegaard (1952)’ http://www.bard.edu/bluecher/lectures/kierkegaard/kierkegaard.htm

 

McDonald, William, "Søren Kierkegaard", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/kierkegaard/>.

 

M.B, “#Soren Kierkegaard” ‘The Economist.’ May 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/05/existential-economics

 

Conway, D. W. & Gover, K. E. ‘Søren Kierkegaard: Social and political philosophy : Kierkegaard and the "Present Age.’ Taylor & Francis, 2002.

 

Fremstedal, R. “Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard on the Ethico-Religious” in Ideas in History Vol. 1 (2206)

 

Davidson, R. M. “Herzen & Kierkegaard” ‘Slavic Review’ Vol 25, No. 2 (June., 1966) pp. 191-209

 

Baudelaire, C. ‘The Salon of 1846: On the Heroism of Modern Life’ ("De l'Héroïsme de la Vie Moderne,") - Salon de 1846 (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1846)

 

Kant, Immanuel. "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?" (What is Enlightenment?) Berlinische Monatsschrift Book. 4, 12. December, 1784), pages 481-494.

 

Garff, Joakim. Kierkegaard: A Biography. Princeton University Press, 2005.

 

Stewart, Jon. Søren Kierkegaard - Subjectivity, Irony and the Crisis of Modernity, University of Copehagen. 

 

Kierkegaard, S. ‘The Point of View of My Work as an Author’ trans. W. Lowrie, New York, 1962

 

Kierkegaard, S. ‘Attack Upon Christendom’ Princeton University Press, 1946.

Stewart, J. B. ‘‪Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries: Theology. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007

 

(The Danish philosopher Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855) believed that philosophy should focus on deep questions related to God, humanity, ethics, and meaning in life. Kierkegaard discusses a process by which human beings can acquire deep satisfaction and become authentic persons. In order to understand this process he often discusses the stages on life’s way. The first stage on life’s way is the aesthetic stage. The main goal of a person in this stage is to satisfy her desires. The second stage is the ethical stage, in which the primary goal is to live according to ethical truth. In this stage, there are moral limits on what one can and cannot do. The religious stage is where the individual finds true fulfillment and becomes truly authentic. Here, one receives forgiveness from God, which resolves guilt and eradicates despair. She is now becoming an authentic individual because she is rightly related to God by a passionate faith in Him. - Michael W. Austin, Ph.D., is a Professor of Philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University)

All Rights Reserved & Copyright 2014 David John Drew

Edinburgh University: Hume and Miracles

 

Was Hume right to think that one should never believe that a miracle has taken place based on testimony?

 

My first task in addressing this question was to analyze Hume’s definition of ‘miracle’ and ‘testimony.’ Hume asserts that a miracle is ‘… a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws… nothing is esteemed a miracle if it happens in the common course of nature’ (Hume, Miracles, P. 114-5) And ‘… a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent’ (Hume, Miracles, P. 115). We may understand the term ‘testimony’ to mean either the written or oral account of an observed event. In ‘Miracles’ Hume considers three forms of testimony; of the human, of the senses and memory, and of God. The term ‘Laws of Nature’ is perhaps more difficult to comprehend. Whilst the concept of natural law had existed for some considerable time in history, John Locke (1632–1704) brought to it a definitive form. Locke emphasized natural law as a system, maintaining particular moral truths applicable to all people universally. Natural law is made distinct from the ‘divine’ law promoted by religion (Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy. 2010). We may summarize the concept of natural law as a condition created by the Deity enabling harmony and social accord. It appears, in Hume’s argument any intervention in this state of the world by the Deity would amount to a violation or transgression. 

I came to understand that Hume’s essay on miracles is placed centrally in the context of the philosophy of religion, theology and the Deist controversy that arose in the 18^th century (English Deism; David Hume. IEP). Hume assumes the Deist position with regard to miracles and expands his argument along those lines. Deism is defined as; “God created the world, endowed it with the ability to function without the need for his continuing presence or interference” (McGrath, Christian Theology, p. 285). Hume concedes, in his definition of miracles to the presence of a supreme, divine authority, to the creation of a system of universal organization, but denies that such an (invisible) agent would necessarily intervene in the world. The Deist view was a rejection of any miraculous event not on the basis of human testimony, which could be regarded as a product of the imagination, but that it fundamentally contradicts the limitations imposed by the Deity. The Christian theologian argues for the miracle as proof of God, for example in the Doctrine of the Resurrection – the key element and most important facet of faith (Felton, Resurrection, 1734), whereas Hume denies the miracle as ‘proof’ of the existence of, or a ‘sign’ from God. 

 

In conclusion, Hume measures testimony against the predictable regularity of the ‘law of nature’ with regard to the authenticity of the occurrence of any (unusual event) miracle. Hume does not necessarily reject miracles on their basis as isolated events, since he is unable to establish them as a cause. The only effect that he determines is the testimony given of them by human witness, which he dispels as inadequate. He concludes that the ‘miracle’ is a personal experience rather than one that demands testimony. 

 

“Our most holy religion is founded on faith not reason… mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person…” (Hume, Miracles p. 130-1)

 

Even in the example of the miracle of resurrection “that a dead man should come to life…” (Hume, Miracles. P. 115) Hume cannot offer proof that this is not possible or a probability. Contrary to his assertion, a human can die according to the medical definition and, for no apparent reason explainable by science come back to life (Adhiyaman… The Lazarus Syndrome. 2007). This leads us to understand events not as isolated incidents, the dynamics of the world cannot be contained within a regulated system – but to consider processes, death and a process rather than an event. In this light all events are processes that possess variable outcomes. Hume was incorrect to think that a miracle should be disregarded on the basis of testimony, testimony is evidence. Without testimony there is no argument.

 

Hume, David, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Volume 921, Clarendon Press, 1902

 

Tuckness, Alex, "Locke's Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/locke-political/>.

 

 “English Deism – David Hume”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL = http://www.iep.utm.edu/deismeng/

 

McGrath, Alistair, Christian Theology: An Introduction Third Edition, Wiley, 2001

 

Felton, Henry, The Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection: As it Stood Before the Law. A Sermon Preached Before the University of Oxford, at St. Mary's, Nov. 24. 1734. Ben. Motte London, 1735

 

The Lazarus phenomenon Vedamurthy Adhiyaman, Sonja Adhiyaman, Radha Sundaram J R Soc Med. 2007 December; 100(12): 552–557.

All Rights Reserved & Copyright // David John Drew 2014