1. In what way can philosophy or philosophical thinking contribute to the physical sciences?
What is science? What is the difference between science and pseudo-science? What is the relationship between philosophy and science? This essay assesses the important liaison between science and philosophy, how science emerged historically out of philosophy, and argues for the maintenance and continued interdependence relationship of the two. What is science, whence does it come and to what purpose? The etymology of the term science is derived from the Latin noun scientia (knowledge, learning) combined with the verb scire (to know). The term was universally applied within the context of, and in connection with natural philosophy.
Science as we understand it today, as the systematic empirical analysis of the structure and dynamics of the natural world through observation could be said to have originated in the Western world with the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, accredited as being the founder of the school of natural sciences according to Aristotle in his ‘Metaphysics.’ (Metaph. 983 b21-22). The first to investigate nature, the world, astronomy, and cosmology. Science as a discipline, evolved out of ‘philosophia naturalis’ (natural philosophy). However, since the Enlightenment, science and philosophy have formed their own distinct disciples.
The divergence in the roles of science and philosophy is the cause of much dispute. Alexander Spirkin, in ‘Philosophy and Science’ (Dialectical Materialism, 1983) asks whether philosophy and science can work in concord, and construct a symbiotic partnership?
“Can philosophy develop by itself, without the support of science? Can science "work" without philosophy? Some people think that the sciences can stand apart from philosophy, that the scientist should actually avoid philosophising, the latter often being understood as groundless vague theorising… The sciences cannot and should not break their connections with philosophy…”
A principle scientific, heuristic tool appears to have emerged through the Fransiscan scholar William of Occam in the first half of the 14th century – which has come to be called ‘Occam’s Razor.’ Occam’s principle (as it was later stated) postulated that amongst competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. However, this principle is not to be found in any of his works. The closest methodology that Occam expresses in terms of scientific enquiry is that of logic, in his Summa Logicae (c. 1323):
“Logic is the most useful tool of all the arts. Without it no science can be fully known. It is not worn out by repeated use, after the manner of material tools, but rather admits of continual growth through the diligent exercise of any other science. For just as a mechanic who lacks a complete knowledge of his tool gains a fuller [knowledge] by using it, so one who is educated in the firm principles of logic, while he painstakingly devotes his labor to the other sciences, acquires at the same time a greater skill at this art…”
An example of the continued relationship between science and philosophy is Isaac newton’s 1687 treatise ‘The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.’ It is important to note that Newton did not regard himself as acting in any specialized field outside of philosophy, rather to avoid any possible misunderstanding amongst his readers he maintained (four) Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy (appearing completely in the final edition of 1726). These Four Rules revolutionized the investigation of all the world’s unsolved mysteries and natural phenomena, providing him with a new analytical formula to replace that which Aristotle had established, and to update the Galileo’s experimental method.
1) Admit no more causes of natural things than are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. 2) To the same natural effect, assign the same causes. 3) Qualities of bodies, which are found to belong to all bodies within experiments, are to be esteemed universal. 4) Propositions collected from observation of phenomena should be viewed as accurate or very nearly true until contradicted by other phenomena.
A contemporary of Isaac Newton (indeed they actually met in June, 1689), Christian Hugyens (1629 – 1695) proceeded to provide a definitive demarcation between the fields of science (philosophy) and mathematics. What separated the two was the notion of ‘proof.’ Hugyens established the hypothetico-deductive method, he remarks in his ‘Treatise on Light’ (1690):
“One finds in this subject a kind of demonstration which does not carry with it so high a degree of certainty as that employed in geometry; and which differs distinctly from the method employed by geometers in that they prove their propositions by well-established and incontrovertible principles, while here principles are tested by inferences which are derivable from them. The nature of the subject permits of no other treatment. It is possible, however, in this way to establish a probability which is little short of certainty. This is the case when the consequences of the assumed principles are in perfect accord with the observed phenomena, and especially when these verifications are numerous; but above all when one employs the hypothesis to predict new phenomena and finds his expectations realized…”
This was the point from which science became a separate discipline from philosophy. The one practicing science proposes a hypothesis and only then attempts to prove it’s correctness through experimentation and empirical analysis. Contrary to this, nothing could be proven beyond doubt in philosophy. As science developed in it’s own right, the gulf between it and philosophy widened. Despite this, the philosopher was still seemingly accepted as the progenitor of scientific questions and charged with the sort of research that provided answers.
Perhaps the breaking ground for separation between science and philosophy was the development of experimental science of ‘empirical evidence.’ Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) proposed a radical, new style of scientific reasoning in contrast to that form of Aristotelian argumentation in his works the ‘Advancement of Learning’ (1605) and the ‘Novum Organum’ (1620). Bacon advocated an inductive method of reasoning and laid the foundations for the ‘scientific method’ proper. No scientific hypothesis can be accepted without the provision of empirical evidence, facts which, coupled with inference by which a conclusion can be maintained on the basis of observations and experiments. Further, evidence is proof that depends on inference such that it enables the scientist to examine his or her hypothesis in such a way as to see if facts are relevant in support of, or run counter to the hypothesis.
Dorian Sagan in ‘The Cosmic Apprentice’ (2013) argues that whilst science needs rigorous methodologies – in the process of becoming it’s own micro-discipline it has transformed into dogmatism. It hides behind an impenetrable mask of theoretical language, which is comprehensible only to intellectuals. Science must re-connect rather than insist on submerging itself further into the realms of academia.
William Whewell (1794 – 1866), a philosopher, theologian and historian of science was, according to the OED the first to employ the term ‘scientist’ in 1833. In a semantic argument with the romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who claimed that philosopher was too lofty a term with which to describe the practical employment of those in the natural sciences, Whewell suggested the combination of ‘savans’ (a skilled, intelligent person), by analogy, with ‘artist’ to form ‘scientist.’ Whewell later used the term ‘scientist’ in a satirical sense in a review of a book written by Mary Somerville and entitled ‘On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences.’ It was Whewell’s intention to point out an ever-increasing separation between the activities of the independent scientist and those of the philosopher – with the introduction of highly specified terms such as physicist, mathematician, chemist, and naturalist.
The main thrust and progressive path of modern science has coalesced into what many opponents have termed ‘scientism,’ the overreliance of the scientific community on the universal applicability of the scientific method, and the belief that diagnostic empirical science alone constitutes the sole authoritative and rational explanation for natural phenomena. The philosopher Tom Sorell in his work ‘Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science’ (1994) proposes that over-identification with rational scientific methodologies has done much harm to western philosophy, the arts and humanities. Sorell points out that philosophy is certainly not science, and he dismisses the notion of attempting to revive ‘natural philosophy.’ Scientism first appeared as logical positivism. Defined by a group called the ‘Vienna Circle’ in 1922. The ultimate goal of the Vienna Circle was to establish a ‘unified science’ within which every statement was solely a product of absolute, verifiable experience and expressed by pure logic.
It may not be possible to reduce all observations to a logical formula, however the claim is that scientific reasoning is based on the inductive method. The philosopher Karl Popper (1902 – 1994) criticized and rejected induction in favor of the ‘falsification theory’ by claiming that the scientific method was in fact deductive, and lacked logic. Falsification does not attempt to secure or prove a conclusion by fact, but introduces a statement posed as a question, that must be proven false by competing evidence.
Another type of reasoning employed in science is ‘inference to the best explanation’ – often also called ‘abduction.’ This type of argument doesn’t attempt to directly prove the validity of an argument, but merely maintains that the conclusion of a theory is the best or superior of all the possible explanations, and therefore inferentially true. In his book ‘The Scientific Image,’ (1980) Bas van Fraasen proposes an alternative (constructive empiricism) to scientific realists who employ IBE in defense of their theories, especially those that discuss unobservable phenomena.
Conclusion
Both science and philosophy are interactive in asking the most basic questions regarding the nature of the world around us. They share methodological reasoning as the basis for their research. The methods vary, but the resulting debates are invigorating and creative. A pro-active working relationship between philosophy and science prohibits a drift toward sterility.
Perhaps the most fruitful contribution to the debate of the relationship between philosophy and science is Thomas Kuhn’s ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962). Kuhn introduced a new paradigm with the suggestion that science doesn’t possess any a particular method of argumentation. Kuhn challenged the accepted view of science as possessing an accumulative agenda with regard to knowledge and theories. Science does not proceed in a straight historical line, with each new discovery building on the last. Rather the process is broken into revolutions, crisis and ‘normal’ periods.
There were two major reactions amongst the scientific community to Kuhn’s book: firstly, those who believed that he had introduced a particularly human element into scientific history, and those who suggested that he was attempting to insert an irrational and chaotic element into what were previously thought of as brilliant scientific achievements. Rather, Kuhn has suggested a new paradigmatic model that embraces the need to re-evaluate ourselves; the objects of our study and discover creative and innovative ways for solving problems. This cannot be done in isolation, but rather in a dynamic community. It is on this level that philosophy can enrich science, and vice-versa.
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2. In what way can cognitive science inform issues in the philosophy of mind?
Introduction: Mind and Consciousness; The Human Frontier
We stand on the frontiers of knowledge concerning the human mind. Together with the cognitive sciences (psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence), philosophy is able to draw more informed conclusions with regard to how the brain and the mind work. Herein I will focus on consciousness, with respect to the mind-body, a topic, which is the basis of much debate between scientists and philosophers, and as of yet remains inconclusive. It is one of the most puzzling problems in science today (Sprevak, Lec. 6:1, 2014). I will focus on the various philosophical and scientific approaches to the topic of consciousness, how they relate and whether, collectively they have added to our understanding of the mind.
Defining the Terms
What do we mean by consciousness? In everyday language it is sentience; subjective perception. We might also consider it ‘wakefulness’ as opposed to sleep, or unconsciousness. A third definition proposed by the philosopher Ned Block (1942 -) constitutes two states: (P) phenomenal and (A) access consciousness, P-consciousness is the immediate subjective perception of the senses whereas A-consciousness processes information, and involves higher level forms of brain function (Block, 1998). Lastly, we might include phenomenal consciousness termed ‘qualia’ by Frank Jackson (1943 -). In opposition to physicalism, Jackson proposed the existence of ‘bodily sensations’ and ‘perceptual experiences’ (Jackson, 1982). Qualia is an almost intangible subjective sense of a particular quality, that presents us with a particular form of consciousness.
Intellectual-Material Distinction
Traditionally the approach to the subject of consciousness can be divided up into two views; those that conceive of a division between the mind and body (dualism), and the scientific view that existence, with respect to mind-body including consciousness, possesses a single material origin (monism). The latter claim that everything is essentially physical in nature, of one substance and can be described in such terms (Jaworski, 2011).
Dualism
Theories of mind-body relationship have long been in currency. Beginning with Rene Descartes 1596-1650) in his ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’ (1641), who defined it with respect to thinking, the process of ideas and perception. Descartes does not give a full, acceptable analysis of the concept of consciousness, but does provide us with the first ‘primitive’ psychological understandings of thought in terms of consciousness (Jorgensen, 2014). Perhaps Descartes major contribution to the field was his theory of ‘dualism’ positing that the mind was distinct from the physical nature of the body. In this, attempting to reconcile increasingly scientific views with that of traditional religious beliefs; the mind and body have radically different properties.
Physicalism
Otto von Neurath (1882-1945) attempted to establish a completely universal standard system of logical empiricism which he outlined in his essay ‘Physicalism’ – such that could be applied to all of the sciences. Such a system rejects all notions of metaphysics, even associated and related forms of language and description. In line with the physicalist thesis, terminological words such as ‘consciousness’ must be replaced by neuro-physiological descriptions (Symons, Pombo, Torres, 2010) – in any sense, consciousness is reduced to physiological matters.
The Hard Problem: Inconclusive Conclusion
David Chalmers (1966 -) describes consciousness as a mundane fact of the world yet ‘mysterious’ – intangible, and almost indefinable. However he goes on to characterize it as ‘the subjective quality of experience’ (Chalmers, 1997). Experience is the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). Consciousness is difficult to grasp because it is a grey area between phenomenology and neuroscience. Whereas the cognitive sciences can readily explain processes occurring within the brain and mind, subjective experience is infinitely more difficult to grasp because it is more a perception of sensation combined with the notion that it is ‘something it is like’ to be a conscious being. Consciousness is what makes the mind-body dilemma troublesome (Nagel, 1974). Presently we are in a stalemate with regard to these two apparently irreconcilable opposing views (Sprevak, 2014). There is no unified theory of consciousness that is unconditionally accepted by both phenomenologists and physicalists (Carmel, Lec 6:2, 2014).
Nowhere is this division more amplified than in the most recent stand taken by philosophers such as Colin McGinn (1950 -), a position termed ‘New Mysterianism.’ In a provocative challenge, McGinn resolutely refuses the possibility of any acceptable solution to the consciousness dilemma, asking;
“How can Technicolor phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? … Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a total blank on the nature of this conversion…” (McGinn, 1989).
References.
Sprevak, M. “What is Consciousness?” (Part I) Lecture 6:1 In ‘Philosophy and the Sciences’ Edinburgh University, 2014
Ned Block (1998). "On a confusion about a function of consciousness". In N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Guzeldere. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136.
Jaworski, W. ‘The Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction.’ John Wiley and Sons, 2011.
Descartes, R. ‘Meditations on First Philosophy,’ translated by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
“Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science” in ‘Volume 18 of Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science.’ Editors, J. Symons, O. Pomba, J. M. Torres. Springer Science, 2010.
Jorgensen, L. M. “Seventeenth Century Theories of Consciousness” in ‘Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’ 2014. Accessed: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-17th/
Chalmers, D. J. ‘The Conscious Mind: In Search of a fundamental Theory.’ Oxford University Press, 1997
Chalmers, D. J. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” in the ‘Journal of Consciousness Studies’ 2(3):200-19, 1995.
Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. 1974.
Carmel, D. “What is Consciousness?” (Part II) Lecture 6:2 In ‘Philosophy and the Sciences’ Edinburgh University, 2014
McGinn, C. "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?", in Mind, New Series, 98 (391), 1989.
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